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- Another One (Can't) Bite the Dust: ICSID Awards Cannot Be Assigned Without The Respondent State's Consent
Another One (Can't) Bite the Dust: ICSID Awards Cannot Be Assigned Without The Respondent State's Consent
Ioannis Alexopoulos and Pietro Grassi of Signature Litigation analyse the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Operafund Eco-Invest SICAV plc v Kingdom of Spain, which held that ICSID arbitration awards cannot be voluntarily assigned without the respondent State’s consent and that assignees cannot directly enforce such awards in England, examining the conflicting approaches taken by courts in the US, Australia and the Netherlands and the implications for litigation funders seeking to acquire, monetise and enforce investment treaty awards

Introduction
Can the successful claimant in an ICSID arbitration sell its award, and can the buyer then enforce it directly against the respondent State? In Operafund Eco-Invest SICAV plc and others v The Kingdom of Spain [2026] EWCA Civ 1392, the Court of Appeal has held that the answer is "no" – at least where the assignment is voluntary and the respondent State has not consented.
On 2 November 2026, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by Blasket Renewable Investments LLC ("Blasket") against the Commercial Court's refusal to recognise it as the assignee of an ICSID award against Spain.
The Court decided three things. First, international law gives an investor no general right to assign an ICSID award without the respondent State's consent. Second, only a party to the award can seek recognition and enforcement under Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention. Third, registration under section 2 of the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1966 (the 1966 Act) does not create a separate assignable English-law right.
Background to the dispute
Following changes to Spain's renewable energy support regime, Operafund Eco-Invest SICAV plc and Schwab Holding AG (the "Investors") commenced arbitration against Spain on 31 July 2015 under the Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT") and the ICSID Convention. On 6 September 2019, the tribunal awarded them approximately EUR 29.3 million.
The award was registered in England and Wales under section 2(1) of the 1966 Act on 14 September 2021. Spain's State immunity challenge failed (Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. v Kingdom of Spain [2026] UKSC 9), as did its annulment application.
On 31 January 2024, the Investors assigned all their rights under the award to Blasket, which applied to be substituted for them under CPR 19.2(4).
HHJ Pelling KC refused the application ([2025] EWHC 2874 (Comm)), holding that the award was not assignable as a matter of international law.
The Court of Appeal's decision
The appeal raised five issues:
whether the Investors could assign the award;
whether Article 15 of the ECT precluded assignment;
whether an assignee may seek recognition or enforcement under Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention;
whether enforcement proceedings begun before the assignment sufficed; and
whether section 2 of the 1966 Act created an independent assignable right.
Foxton LJ (Males and Lewison LJJ agreeing) dismissed the appeal.
No general right under international law to assign treaty rights
Neither the ECT nor the ICSID Convention expressly permits assignment. Between States, treaty rights cannot be transferred without the obligor State's consent, and Foxton LJ saw "real force" in applying the same logic to investors. An investor cannot change the person to whom a State owes payment without that State's agreement.
The Lotus principle did not assist: the absence of a prohibition confers no positive power to assign, and a handful of foreign decisions could not establish a new customary rule.
Article 15 of the ECT does not resolve the issue
Spain argued that Article 15 of the ECT, which provides for assignment and subrogation where a State pays under an indemnity or guarantee, impliedly excluded other assignments. The Court disagreed, but the absence of an exclusion could not supply the missing positive legal basis for assignment.
Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention: who can seek enforcement?
Blasket argued that "a party" in Article 54(2) extended to an assignee. Foxton LJ, while not finding the issue "straightforward", read it alongside Article 53 as meaning a party to the award, and rejected an "evolutionary" interpretation: this was a "hard-edged binary question".
Foxton LJ described the divergence from US, Australian and Dutch decisions as "highly unfortunate", but the Convention's wording, structure and purpose supported the narrower reading.
Blasket's argument that it could take over proceedings begun before the assignment was "hopeless as a matter of language": a party is "seeking" recognition throughout the process.
Registration under the 1966 Act does not create a separate assignable right
Section 2 is machinery for giving effect to the Convention; it creates no new substantive right and cannot turn a non-assignable award into an assignable domestic right. Blasket's approach would also split enforcement rights between countries, seeking to "divide the indivisible", contrary to Micula v Romania.
How have courts elsewhere approached the issue?
The English position is at odds with several other enforcement jurisdictions:
(a) United States
In Blue Ridge Investments LLC v Republic of Argentina and a series of 2026 cases against Spain, US courts treated Article 54(2) as purely procedural and allowed Blasket to enforce as assignee.
(b) Australia
In Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v Kingdom of Spain [2025] FCA 1028, the Federal Court of Australia held that Blasket was a valid assignee and could enforce.
(c) The Netherlands
In Eurus Energy Holdings Corporation v Kingdom of Spain (21 July 2026), the Rotterdam District Court held that "a party" could include an assignee.
Key takeaways and practical implications
(a) No sale without consent
An investor cannot voluntarily transfer an ICSID award without the respondent State's consent.
(b) Only the original winner can enforce
Only a party to the award may seek enforcement under Article 54(2); starting enforcement before the sale is no workaround. The outcome elsewhere may differ, depending on where enforcement is sought.
(c) Monetisation is still possible, but structure matters
Award holders and funders should keep the original award creditor as the enforcing party, supported by robust contractual arrangements on cooperation, control and distribution of proceeds.
(d) Seated New York Convention awards are not affected
The decision is specific to the ICSID Convention and is not a general prohibition on assigning arbitral awards, including New York Convention, UNCITRAL, ICC or SCC awards.
(e) Open questions
The Court left open involuntary transfers (for example, on insolvency or corporate succession) and assignments to which the respondent State has consented.
Conclusion
Operafund is an important development in the enforcement of investment treaty awards in England and Wales, significantly limiting the ability of third parties to acquire and directly enforce ICSID awards. The reasoning is principled and anchored in the text of the Convention. The outcome, however, sits uneasily with commercial reality: Spain has not paid an award it is bound by treaty to honour, and the decision makes that award harder to monetise.
The judgment also highlights the difficulty of achieving consistent interpretation of multilateral treaties across national courts, a real concern for investors and funders pursuing States with assets in multiple jurisdictions.
Blasket has sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, and given the divergent rulings across major jurisdictions, we do not expect this to be the last word. In the meantime, acquiring, assigning and enforcing ICSID awards requires careful attention to the international law framework, the identity of the award creditor and the enforcement strategy in each jurisdiction. Clients should plan for continued uncertainty rather than assume the current English position will hold.